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1. Introduction.
The process of regional decentralization in Spain involves the transfer of those
expenditure policies that may be managed more efficiently by Autonomous
Communities (hereafter AC’s) in comparison with central government. Nowadays, the
National Health Service in Spain comprises seven Regional Health Services, which
manage public health care in those regions having responsibility for health services, and
INSALUD, the agency which manages public health care in the rest of the country. This
process of decentralization will be further developed in the near future. For this reason,
it is interesting to analyse the impact that health care transfer will have on regional
budgets. Furthermore, the relevance of this issue is a consequence of the huge volume
of resources allocated to health care. In fact, public expenditure on health care in Spain
represents the 6% of GDP, and the proportion of the budget corresponding to regional
governments that was assigned to health care in 1998 was the 26%.
The aim of this paper is two-folded. Firstly, we simulate under several
hypotheses the transfer of health care management to all the AC’s and we analyse the
effects of this process on regional budgets. Secondly, we estimate the budgetary effects
of the integration of health care resources into the general financing scheme of the
Spanish AC’s. These effects are compared to those derived from the present financing
system, where health care is financed by a specific fund. The analysis simulates the
evolution of regional resources and health care expenditure for two different periods:
1997-2000 and 2002-2006. The first one comprises those years corresponding to the
present period of regional financing for which relevant information is available. The
second one corresponds to the next period of regional financing. In this latter case some
alternative scenarios, that take into account several changes in the group of taxes
transferred to the Spanish regions, are considered.
Following this introduction come five further sections. Section 2 revises the
most recent Spanish health care financing schemes and describes those hypotheses
considered to distribute health care expenditure to AC’s. Section 3 analyses the present
regional financing system. Sections 4 and 5 describe the assumptions made to calculate
the evolution of regional resources and show the main results for the first and second
period, respectively. Finally, section 6 summarises the main conclusions.2
2. The Spanish health care expenditure: financing and allocation to regional
governments.
Public health care financing has been subject to continuous reforms. From 1981
to 1993, the historical cost of health care delivery had been the base for the resource
allocation to those Spanish regions having responsibility for health care services,
although a transitory period was set up in order to adapt the allocation percentages to
the covered population criterion. The system described, however, did not guarantee the
principles of stability, equity and sufficiency, which had to govern the health care
financing mechanism.
 Consequently, the Spanish health care financing scheme was revised in 1994, and it
was adopted a new system for the period 1994-1997, for which the relevant variable to
allocate health care resources to the regions was the proportion of covered population
living in each AC. Moreover, a small part of the resources was distributed according to
the burden of no-resident patients who received medical treatment out of their region of
residence. In addition, some other new elements were introduced in that system: the rate
of growth of GDP was adopted as the reference for the growth of public expenditure on
health and, additionally, the regional health care expenditure was further restricted.
Finally, in November 1997 the present health care financing scheme, which will
prevail until the year 2001, was adopted. This new system keeps the basic features from
the previous one: the percentage of covered population is the base of the resource
allocation formula, and the GDP rate of growth is the reference for the evolution of
health care expenditure. However, two significant new elements are introduced: an
important increase in the amount of resources to be distributed, and a new specific fund
aimed to compensate territorial desequilibria caused by differential costs from teaching-
load and from medical treatment for no-residents. In addition, a part of this fund is
aimed to compensate regions for losses of population from 1991 to 1996, in order to
guarantee a certain level of resources for every AC.
Although the reforms described, health care financing is still one of the most
debated issues in Spain, because the present system guarantees neither equity nor
sufficiency in the allocation of health care resources. This debate has derived in two
basic alternatives in order to reform the present scheme: the first alternative (line of
expenditure) would consist of estimating the requisite expenditure to cover the cost of
transferred services in order to distribute resources among regions according to those3
estimations. The second alternative (line of revenues) would try to guarantee a certain
volume of state financing, complemented by the fiscal effort of AC’s.
Following the first alternative described, distribution of health care funds among
regions should be related to the proportion of population adjusted for need, in order to
remove regional desequilibria. This option is represented by the well-known RAWP
formula (Resource Allocation Working Party), which has been used in the United
Kingdom for the later 25 years in order to distribute health care funds equitably.
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Moreover, the second alternative would allow the AC’s to exert a real power in the
design of expenditure policies. Additionally, a redistributive financing component could
be introduced through a specific and conditioned fund (López, 1998). Following this
second option, the integration of health care financing into the regional financing
scheme is the most suitable alternative, given that health care is completely financed by
general taxes and not by social contributions.
In this paper we analyse the financial consequences from the health care transfer
process, and we estimate the financial effects caused by the integration of health care
funds into the regional financing scheme. In order to do that, we will use three different
variables to distribute health care expenditure among regions: real cost, covered
population and population adjusted for need.
2 In order to compute the evolution of
expenditure in those models without integration, the following assumptions have been
considered. In the first period analysed, and considering the distribution of resources
according to the real cost, public expenditure on health for those regions with health
care management transferred corresponds to official figures (Regional Budgets or State
Budget). As data from real cost for those regions managed by INSALUD are not
available for the whole period, we have considered that health care expenditure for these
AC’s grows every year at a common rate. This rate corresponds to the annual rate of
growth of those resources allocated to primary and specialised care. Finally, when
covered population and population adjusted for need are considered, public expenditure
on health grows at the same rate of GDP. This later assumption is also assumed for the
second period of analysis (2002-2006) and it is applied to the three models considered
(real cost, covered population and population adjusted for need).
3. The Spanish regional financing scheme: implementation and reform.
The Spanish regional financing scheme was deeply reformed in 1996. This
reform has been applied to 12 out of the 17 AC’s (País Vasco and Navarra have been
excluded because of their special financing regime, and Andalucía, Extremadura and4
Castilla-La Mancha because they have rejected the reform agreement). This reform is
characterised by three basic features. Firstly, it modifies the previous system based on
the participation in State revenues, by introducing the personal income tax (IRPF) as a
partially transferred tax. Secondly, it strengthens the power given to AC’s to change tax
legislation. Thirdly, it modifies the reference indices that determine the evolution of
regional resources by introducing some guarantees.
The new system guarantees the previous volume of resources allocated to the
Spanish regions. However, it substitutes a part of the regional funds, which was
obtained from the participation in State revenues (PIE), by a double participation
(15%+15%) in the net liability of the IRPF, according to the level of functions
transferred to the AC’s.
One of the basic features of this reform corresponds to the form of determining
the rate of growth of regional resources. Initially, tax revenues (transferred taxes and
personal income tax) will grow according to the regional collection, and the rest of
revenues will grow at the same rate of the State revenues (ITAE). However, some
guarantees have been set up in order to keep a minimum volume of resources for the
AC’s which is related to the rate of growth of GDP.
The first guarantee increases regional resources by offering a complement to the
revenues from IRPF. This complement covers the difference between the growth of tax
revenues and the growth of GDP. Moreover, the second guarantee covers the difference
between the rate of growth of the ITAE and the rate corresponding to GDP. Finally, the
third guarantee tries to reduce inequalities in the amount of resources obtained by the
Spanish regions.
According to available data, those regions with the highest number of functions
transferred have obtained more benefits from the new financing scheme. However, this
new system has improved income levels of the poorest regions. If the number of
functions transferred increases in the near future, as is expected, the financial
dependence from the State revenues will also rise. Therefore, the proposed model for
the next period (2002-2006) should increase the tax autonomy of the AC’s by
transferring a higher proportion of taxes to the Spanish regions. This increase in the
degree of tax co-responsibility should also guarantee a volume of resources enough to
finance the functions transferred from State. In order to achieve this aim, a part or the
whole collection from excise duties, VAT or IRPF could be transferred to the AC’s.5
Following this section we try to calculate the financial effects caused by the
integration of health care financing into the regional financing scheme, once we have
assumed that health care management has been transferred to all the AC’s.
3 For the first
period the estimations are derived from the present regional financing scheme. For the
second period some alternative scenarios, that take into account several changes in the
group of taxes transferred to the Spanish regions, are considered.
4. Method and results for the period 1997-2000.
Table 1 shows the components of regional resources for 1996, used as base year
for the first period. First of all, data show the distribution of health care funds according
to the three variables considered. Secondly, the table shows the resources corresponding
to the basic financing, as well as its components. TIR refers to that part of the Spanish
personal income tax transferred to the AC’s. PIR represents the regional participation in
the total collection from IRPF and PIG refers to the rest of resources transferred by the
State. The first two components evolve according to the rate of growth of the net
liability from IRPF, whilst the PIG evolve according to the rate of growth of the ITAE.
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The relevant indices of evolution for the period 1997-2000 are summarised in table 2.
Moreover, tables 3-5 summarise the effects that integration of health care funds
into the regional financing schedule would have on the amount of resources obtained by
the AC’s. The results show that the Spanish regions as a whole obtain a potential gain of
resources when health care funds are integrated into the general financing system,
irrespective of the hypothesis used to distribute health care resources. This fact can be
explained by the high rate of growth of the ITAE for this period, which is the variable
that determines the growth of the PIG. The cumulative rates of growth of the ITAE are
higher than those corresponding to GDP and to the real health care cost, which guide the
evolution of health care funds in the models that consider covered
population/population adjusted for need and real cost, respectively.
The highest gains obtained by the integration of health care funds into the
general financing scheme correspond to 1997 and 1999 for the hypothesis of real cost.
This result can be explained because the rate of growth of health care cost is lower than
the rate of GDP up to 1999.
For the real cost model (table 3), total gains generated by the integration of
health care financing into the general financing schedule vary from the 3.05% of
supplementary resources in 1999 to the 4.35% in 1997. All the Spanish regions, except
the Canary Islands in 1999 and 2000, would obtain benefits from the new system,6
although the results differ for different regions. Additionally, the highest gains
correspond to the AC’s that don’t manage health care delivery.
When we consider the distribution of health care resources according to covered
population (table 4), total gains obtained by the integration of health care funds into the
general financing schedule vary from the 1.89% of supplementary funds in 1998 to the
3.78% in 2000. In this case, a part of the gains is due to the volume of guarantees that
correspond to the integrated model, although the main proportion of gains is due to the
evolution of the ITAE for this first period. All the Spanish regions would benefit from
the integrated system and the dispersion among them would be significantly reduced in
comparison with the real cost model.
Finally, when population adjusted for need is taken as reference to distribute
health care funds (table 5), our results are very similar to those described above. In this
case, total gains from the integrated system would vary from the 1.89% in 1998 to the
3.83% in 2000. However, the distribution of gains among regions is far different from
that obtained with the two previous models.
5. Method and results for the period 2002-2006.
2000 is the base year used for this second period, for which we simulate some
alternative scenarios of regional financing. The first scenario considered corresponds to
the present system, which introduces the partial transfer of IRPF to the AC’s. In the
second scenario we assume that excise duties are transferred, and collection is allocated
to the Spanish regions according to their population in 2000. The percentage of
collection transferred depends on the health care financing scheme considered: 25% if
health care is not integrated into the general financing system, and 100% in other case.
The third scenario assumes that VAT is transferred to the AC’s according to
consumption data from the Household Budget Continuous Survey. In this case, the
percentage of collection transferred is the 10% if health care is not integrated into the
general financing scheme, and 50% if integration applies. Finally, the fourth scenario
assumes an increase in the proportion of the IRPF transferred. For the non-integration
alternative, an 8.5% additional transfer is considered for all the AC’s, except for
Madrid, where the 31.5% is assigned. For the integration alternative, a 38.5% additional
transfer is assumed for all the regions. The evolution of the personal income tax
collection is calculated according to the GDP rate of growth, given that we assume the
preservation of the first guarantee.7
Once the resources to be allocated to the AC’s are determined for the year used
as the base for the second period, we have to set up some rules in order to calculate the
evolution of regional financing components. For transferred taxes we will calculate the
future collection assigned to the Spanish regions according to the evolution of collection
at a national level.
In order to simulate the development of the regional financing scheme for the
next period, we consider a macroeconomic scenario based on a frame of stable growth,
defined by a gradual decrease in the rate of growth up to 2005, which is followed by a
light increase in 2006. Moreover, we assume a light increase in the ratio ITAE/GDP up
to 2003 (33.45%), followed by a further decrease from 2004 and a further stability in
2006 (33.25%). Consequently, we consider that ITAE grow at a higher rate than GDP
for the whole period. The evolution of ITAE is caused by the development of those
taxes integrated in this concept. VAT and excise duties, except tax burden on beer and
oil, grow at a higher rate than GDP, whilst IRPF grows at a lightly lower rate. Table 6
shows the relevant indices applied to the regional financing components for the period
2002-2006.
Once more, our results show that the integration of health care funds into the
general financing scheme involves significant financial gains for the Spanish regions as
a whole.
5 Gains computed for the period 2002-2006 are, however, lower than those
corresponding to the present period. The highest volume of gains corresponds to the
scenario defined by VAT transfer (2.61%, equivalent to 1.3 billion pesetas for the whole
period), followed by the present scheme (1.02%, equivalent to 497,928 million pesetas).
In the third place, the scenario of excise duties’ transfer generates gains equivalent to
337,570 million pesetas (0.69%) and, finally, the scenario of increase in the proportion
of IRPF transferred involves gains equivalent to 270,305 million pesetas (0.56%). This
ranking is basically explained by the evolution of financing sources in each case. So, as
it is shown in table 6, the cumulative rates of growth that had been calculated for VAT
are higher than those estimated for ITAE. At the same time, the ITAE rate of growth is
higher than the index calculated for the excise duties, whilst IRPF collection shows the
lowest rate.
Tables 7-18 show the effects of integration of health care funds into the general
financing scheme, for all the scenarios considered and for the three alternative ways to
allocate health care resources among regions. These effects are related to four aspects of
regional financing. Firstly, the tables show the increase in the volume of resources8
available to the Spanish regions for the whole period when we consider the integration
of health care financing system into the general scheme. Secondly, the effects over tax
co-responsibility are shown, starting from the changes in the ratio tax revenues/total
revenues. The third column of tables point out the per capita gains generated by the
integration of health care funds into the general financing system. Moreover, the fourth
column represents (by indices) per capita resources for the whole period in the non-
integrated health care financing scheme. When we compare figures in these two
columns we can conclude if those regions with a high/low volume of resources in the
present system are compensated with a decrease/increase in resources thanks to the
integration of health care funds. Therefore, we can evaluate the effects over horizontal
equity for each of the scenarios considered. Finally, the fifth column shows per capita
income for the Spanish regions. When we compare figures in third and fifth column we
can conclude if the integration of health care financing system into the general scheme
contributes to reduce/increase regional desequilibria, as a proxy of the contribution to
vertical equity.
The effects on financial sufficiency of the AC’s caused by the integration of
health care funds into the general financing scheme have been described above. As for
the allocation of gains among regions, some features can be stressed. Although there are
gains for the regions as a whole in the present scenario, the distribution of those gains
among regions is quite unequal. When we consider the scenario of VAT transfer we
obtain a similar result, although the relative position of Madrid changes dramatically,
because it becomes the region with the greatest gains from the integration of health care
funds into the general financing system.
According to the aim of increasing the tax co-responsibility of regions, the
scenario of VAT transfer guarantees the highest ratio tax revenues/total revenues,
followed by the scenario of transfer of excise duties and IRPF, respectively.
When we analyse the per capita gains caused by the integration of health care
funds into the general financing schedule, the relative position of each region varies
depending on the scenario considered. This fact is due to the different criteria of
distribution for transferred taxes that have been adopted. For example, the scenario with
the greatest benefits for Madrid corresponds to the VAT transfer scenario, because the
proportion of consumption for Madrid is higher than the proportion of population,
which has been used to distribute the excise duties.9
With reference to the effects over horizontal equity, the results point out that the
integration of health care funds into the regional financing schedule would reduce the
dispersion among regions, except if an increase in the percentage of IRPF transferred is
considered. Finally, with reference to the effects over vertical equity, the integration of
health care financing system into the general financing schedule would allow a
significant reduction of previous desequilibria in per capita income among regions. This
effect is especially important if health care funds are distributed according to the
population adjusted for need, and also if the scenario of an increase in the percentage of
IRPF transferred is considered.
6. Concluding remarks.
Although the Spanish health care financing scheme has been reformed in several
occasions for the latest years, it is still a controversial issue, given that the new system
doesn’t guarantee the principles of sufficiency and equity in the regional distribution of
resources. When we take into account that social contributions have been eliminated
from health care financing, the alternative of integrating health care funds into the
regional financing system becomes a natural step in the near reform. In addition, it is
necessary to incorporate, as much as possible, some measures that allow AC’s to put
into effect their fiscal effort. On the other hand, the perspective of future
decentralization of health care management forces to analyse the budgetary effects that
could be caused by changes in the financing scheme.
According to the results obtained, we can conclude that the integration of the
health care financing system into the general AC’s financing scheme would generate
more resources for the Spanish regions. This result doesn’t depend on the variable used
to distribute health care funds, given that regional resources obtained from transfers
(PIG) grow at a higher rate than health care funds and tax revenues, irrespective of the
model considered.
The financial resources of AC’s depend basically on two elements: their
financing structure (IRPF, PIG and health care funds), and the rates of growth for each
source of revenues. As long as a strong growth of revenues is expected for the present
period of financing (higher than the growth of GDP), all the AC’s will receive
additional resources, because they obtain benefits from the evolution of ITAE. The
relative gain will be higher in those regions where the proportion of State transfers
represents a higher percentage over total resources.10
According to our results, the integration of health care funds into the regional
financing scheme is recommended, given that this alternative improves financial
sufficiency and fiscal co-responsibility of Spanish regions. Additionally, as long as
collection from excise duties grows at a higher rate than collection from the rest of taxes
included in the ITAE, it would be convenient to transfer excise duties to the AC’s.
We can conclude that integration of health care financing into the regional
financing scheme is always positive, especially if revenues are obtained from VAT
collection. This fact can be explained because the cumulative rate of growth for this
source of income is very much higher than GDP rates of growth, which determine
nowadays health care financing. Additionally, the transfer of VAT would improve the
degree of fiscal co-responsibility of the regions. Anyway, it’s important to remark that
data used for the base year are determinant in the computation of financing for the
whole period, given that we use cumulative indices for each year.
Moreover, the integration of health care funds into the general scheme
contributes to reduce the levels of per capita financing for the Spanish regions, except
when an increase in the percentage of transferred IRPF is assumed. However, this
scenario strongly contributes to compensate regional desequilibria in terms of per capita
income.
Excluding political restrictions, the reform of the financing scheme would have
to consider their effects on sufficiency, fiscal co-responsibility and equity, as well as the
changes that tax collection can suffer in the near future. Our results show that, if we
consider a macroeconomic frame characterised by a stable growth, VAT collection will
grow at a higher rate than collection from excise duties. However, we have to take into
account that collection from excise duties won’t fall as much as collection from VAT if
we consider a less optimistic frame. Additionally, there are more opportunities to
increase tax rates for excise duties, and this increase could be easily justified from a
social point of view (fiscal burden falls on goods that generate external effects). Finally,
from the perspective of public management, it would be possible to set a link between
tax collection and health care delivery. Anyway, the analysis of this issue and their
possible effects deserves further research.11
Table 1. Components of regional financing (1996).
Health care funds








Aragón 111789 3,50% 102016 3,19% 102097 3,20% 42135 27488 9163 5484
Asturias 105466 3,30% 97841 3,06% 105489 3,30% 30927 22438 7479 1010
Baleares 55461 1,74% 63857 2,00% 64725 2,03% 20739 17111 0 3628
Cantabria 50460 1,58% 47287 1,48% 43580 1,36% 26665 10178 10178 6308
C.La Mancha 142401 4,46% 146046 4,57% 155991 4,88% 72697 22146 22146 28405
C.León 213729 6,69% 220607 6,91% 240073 7,52% 120071 44969 44969 30134
Extremadura 95053 2,98% 92720 2,90% 99192 3,11% 56153 11156 11156 33842
La Rioja 21361 0,67% 23305 0,73% 23742 0,74% 10834 5678 3785 1371
Madrid 439914 13,77% 420681 13,17% 383347 12,00% 142941 178759 0 -35818
Murcia 90476 2,83% 91488 2,86% 83986 2,63% 26756 14788 9858 2109
Transferred
Management
Andalucía 609991 19,10% 620203 19,42% 658708 20,62% 624993 89001 89001 446992
Canarias 130518 4,09% 139591 4,37% 134881 4,22% 153730 26410 26410 100910
Cataluña 543114 17,00% 540538 16,92% 494063 15,47% 449838 171375 171375 107088
Galicia 245718 7,69% 237242 7,43% 259279 8,12% 267950 41861 41861 184228
C.Valenciana 338919 10,61% 350947 10,99% 345218 10,81% 261758 71339 71339 119080
Total (a) 3194370 100,00% 3194370 100,00% 3194370 100,00% 2308187 754697 518720 1034771
Notes: million pesetas
(a) Excluding País Vasco and Navarra.
Table 2. Relevant indices for the first period (1996-2000).
BASE YEAR
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PIB 1,0000 1,0546 1,1133 1,1801 1,2476
IRPF (CUOTA LÍQUIDA) 1,0000 1,0286 1,0979 1,2182 1,2234
ITAE 1,0000 1,1131 1,1529 1,2291 1,3412
SANIDAD C. EFECTIVO 1,0000 1,0298 1,0755 1,1642 1,260612
Table 3. Financial gains obtained from the integrated scheme  % (First period, Real cost).
1997 1998 1999 2000
INSALUD
Aragón 6,21% 6,00% 6,36% 5,79%
Asturias 6,68% 6,47% 6,54% 6,00%
Baleares 5,62% 5,74% 6,59% 5,51%
Cantabria 6,17% 5,77% 6,10% 6,83%
Castilla-La Mancha 6,23% 5,83% 6,19% 7,01%
C.León 6,03% 5,64% 5,78% 6,36%
Extremadura 5,87% 5,51% 5,85% 6,59%
La Rioja 5,94% 5,64% 5,98% 5,66%
Madrid 5,29% 5,45% 6,34% 4,57%
Murcia 7,10% 6,71% 7,15% 7,45%
Transferred Management
Andalucía 3,84% 3,22% 1,49% 1,57%
Canarias 2,62% 1,78% -0,44% -0,95%
Cataluña 3,12% 2,86% 1,02% 1,20%
Galicia 4,60% 3,85% 3,83% 5,39%
C.Valenciana 3,23% 2,64% 1,22% 1,80%
Total 4,35% 3,92% 3,05% 3,16%
Table 4. Financial gains obtained from the integrated scheme % (First period, Covered population).
1997 1998 1999 2000
INSALUD
Aragón 3,21% 2,06% 2,45% 3,29%
Asturias 3,52% 2,29% 2,38% 3,39%
Baleares 3,06% 2,07% 2,94% 3,71%
Cantabria 3,53% 2,27% 2,63% 4,69%
Castilla-La Mancha 3,68% 2,36% 2,76% 5,01%
C.León 3,57% 2,30% 2,48% 4,45%
Extremadura 3,41% 2,20% 2,56% 4,62%
La Rioja 3,47% 2,23% 2,61% 3,85%
Madrid 2,35% 1,40% 2,35% 2,29%
Murcia 4,06% 2,60% 3,09% 5,07%
Transferred Management
Andalucía 2,71% 1,75% 2,03% 3,65%
Canarias 2,59% 1,67% 1,93% 3,48%
Cataluña 3,01% 1,93% 2,24% 4,10%
Galicia 2,55% 1,65% 1,92% 3,45%
C.Valenciana 3,14% 2,02% 2,35% 4,27%
Total 2,95% 1,89% 2,26% 3,79%13
Table 5. Financial gains  obtained from the integrated scheme % (First period, Pop. Adjusted for need))
1997 1998 1999 2000
INSALUD
Aragón 3,22% 2,06% 2,45% 3,30%
Asturias 3,63% 2,36% 2,48% 3,62%
Baleares 3,08% 2,08% 2,95% 3,75%
Cantabria 3,43% 2,20% 2,55% 4,54%
Castilla-La Mancha 3,76% 2,42% 2,82% 5,11%
C.León 3,68% 2,36% 2,57% 4,62%
Extremadura 3,50% 2,25% 2,63% 4,74%
La Rioja 3,50% 2,24% 2,63% 3,89%
Madrid 2,35% 1,25% 2,22% 2,29%
Murcia 3,96% 2,54% 3,02% 4,91%
Transferred Management
Andalucía 2,79% 1,80% 2,09% 3,76%
Canarias 2,54% 1,64% 1,90% 3,42%
Cataluña 2,89% 1,85% 2,14% 3,93%
Galicia 2,68% 1,73% 2,01% 3,62%
C.Valenciana 3,12% 2,01% 2,33% 4,24%
Total 2,97% 1,89% 2,26% 3,83%
Table 6. Financial scenarios for the second period: relavant indices.
BASE YEAR
M.M. PTS INDICES
2000 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IRPF 5007 1,0000 1,0973 1,1411 1,1811 1,2165 1,2652
Corporate Income Tax 2563 1,0000 1,2320 1,3059 1,3582 1,3989 1,4828
VAT 5656 1,0000 1,1877 1,2530 1,3157 1,3683 1,4436
Excise Duties 2630 1,0000 1,1192 1,1757 1,2288 1,2764 1,3412
Oil 1522 1,0000 1,0816 1,1249 1,1699 1,2137 1,2623
Alcohol 130 1,0000 1,1880 1,2830 1,3600 1,4280 1,5137
Beer 29 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0200
Intermediate products 4 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000
Tobacco 638 1,0000 1,1664 1,2364 1,2982 1,3501 1,4446
Registration tax 203 1,0000 1,2320 1,3306 1,4104 1,4668 1,5548
Electricity tax 104 1,0000 1,1109 1,1665 1,2190 1,2677 1,3311
Social contributions 9453 1,0000 1,1109 1,1665 1,2155 1,2616 1,3247
Unemployment contributions 1754 1,0000 1,1289 1,1876 1,2351 1,2820 1,3461
Other 515 1,0000 1,1025 1,1521 1,1982 1,2401 1,2897
ITAE 27578 1,0000 1,1372 1,1945 1,2452 1,2904 1,3553
PIB 84443 1,0000 1,1109 1,1665 1,2190 1,2677 1,3311
ITAE/PIB 32,66% 32,66% 33,43% 33,45% 33,36% 33,24% 33,25%14
Table 7.  Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Real cost, present scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 1,15% -0,4% 108 97 121
GALICIA 0,95% -0,1% 103 111 91
ASTURIAS 1,11% -0,2% 115 106 97
CANTABRIA 0,96% -0,2% 109 117 98
LA RIOJA 0,93% -0,2% 94 104 115
MURCIA 1,00% -0,2% 93 95 85
C.VALENCIANA 1,17% -0,3% 103 90 103
ARAGON 1,06% -0,3% 109 105 111
CANARIAS 0,96% -0,2% 100 107 96
BALEARES 1,01% -0,3% 85 86 154
MADRID 0,98% 6,9% 86 89 114
C Y LEON 0,91% -0,2% 98 111 98
ANDALUCIA 1,01% -0,1% 100 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,91% -0,1% 94 106 83
EXTREMADURA 0,88% -0,1% 100 116 79
TOTAL 1,02% 0,7% 100 100 100
Table 8. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Covered pop., present scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 1,13% -0,4% 105 95 121
GALICIA 0,95% -0,1% 103 111 91
ASTURIAS 1,08% -0,2% 110 104 97
CANTABRIA 0,94% -0,2% 105 115 98
LA RIOJA 0,99% -0,2% 106 110 115
MURCIA 1,02% -0,2% 96 97 85
C.VALENCIANA 1,17% -0,3% 104 91 103
ARAGON 1,03% -0,3% 102 101 111
CANARIAS 0,96% -0,2% 101 107 96
BALEARES 1,10% -0,3% 100 93 154
MADRID 0,97% 7,0% 84 89 114
C Y LEON 0,94% -0,2% 104 114 98
ANDALUCIA 1,01% -0,1% 100 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,94% -0,1% 99 108 83
EXTREMADURA 0,88% -0,1% 100 116 79
TOTAL 1,02% 0,7% 100 100 100
Table 9. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Pop.adjusted for need,  present scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 1,08% -0,4% 96 90 121
GALICIA 0,99% -0,1% 112 116 91
ASTURIAS 1,12% -0,2% 118 108 97
CANTABRIA 0,89% -0,2% 97 111 98
LA RIOJA 0,99% -0,2% 107 110 115
MURCIA 0,97% -0,2% 88 93 85
C.VALENCIANA 1,17% -0,3% 102 90 103
ARAGON 1,03% -0,3% 103 102 111
CANARIAS 0,94% -0,2% 97 105 96
BALEARES 1,10% -0,3% 102 94 154
MADRID 0,92% 7,3% 76 84 114
C Y LEON 0,98% -0,2% 114 118 98
ANDALUCIA 1,04% -0,1% 106 105 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,97% -0,1% 106 112 83
EXTREMADURA 0,92% -0,1% 107 119 79
TOTAL 1,02% 0,7% 100 100 10015
Table 10. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Real cost, excise duties).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,81% 25,7% 112 97 121
GALICIA 0,65% 22,1% 105 111 91
ASTURIAS 0,80% 23,6% 122 106 97
CANTABRIA 0,68% 21,3% 114 117 98
LA RIOJA 0,61% 22,3% 92 104 115
MURCIA 0,65% 25,4% 89 95 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,81% 27,0% 105 90 103
ARAGON 0,75% 24,1% 113 105 111
CANARIAS 0,65% 22,9% 100 107 96
BALEARES 0,63% 26,1% 77 86 154
MADRID 0,62% 35,0% 79 89 114
C Y LEON 0,61% 21,6% 98 111 98
ANDALUCIA 0,68% 24,1% 100 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,60% 22,7% 91 106 83
EXTREMADURA 0,60% 21,3% 100 116 79
TOTAL 0,69% 25,4% 100 100 100
Table 11. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Covered population, excise duties).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,78% 25,7% 107 95 121
GALICIA 0,65% 22,1% 104 111 91
ASTURIAS 0,76% 23,6% 114 104 97
CANTABRIA 0,65% 21,3% 108 115 98
LA RIOJA 0,69% 22,3% 109 110 115
MURCIA 0,68% 25,4% 94 97 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,81% 27,0% 106 91 103
ARAGON 0,71% 24,1% 103 101 111
CANARIAS 0,66% 22,9% 101 107 96
BALEARES 0,75% 26,1% 101 93 154
MADRID 0,60% 35,0% 77 89 114
C Y LEON 0,65% 21,6% 107 114 98
ANDALUCIA 0,68% 24,1% 100 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,63% 22,7% 99 108 83
EXTREMADURA 0,60% 21,3% 100 116 79
TOTAL 0,69% 25,4% 100 100 100
Table 12. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Pop. adjusted for need, excise duties).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,72% 27,0% 94 90 121
GALICIA 0,71% 21,2% 118 116 91
ASTURIAS 0,82% 22,7% 127 108 97
CANTABRIA 0,60% 22,2% 95 111 98
LA RIOJA 0,70% 22,2% 111 110 115
MURCIA 0,62% 26,5% 83 93 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,80% 27,2% 104 90 103
ARAGON 0,71% 24,1% 104 102 111
CANARIAS 0,63% 23,3% 96 105 96
BALEARES 0,76% 25,9% 103 94 154
MADRID 0,53% 36,8% 64 84 114
C Y LEON 0,70% 20,7% 120 118 98
ANDALUCIA 0,72% 23,4% 109 105 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,68% 22,0% 109 112 83
EXTREMADURA 0,64% 20,7% 110 119 79
TOTAL 0,69% 25,4% 100 100 10016
Table 13. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Real cost, VAT scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 3,02% 34,1% 112 97 121
GALICIA 2,23% 23,4% 95 111 91
ASTURIAS 2,69% 29,4% 109 106 97
CANTABRIA 2,29% 24,8% 102 117 98
LA RIOJA 2,50% 27,1% 100 104 115
MURCIA 2,39% 24,9% 87 95 85
C.VALENCIANA 2,85% 30,2% 98 90 103
ARAGON 2,69% 30,3% 108 105 111
CANARIAS 2,35% 25,3% 96 107 96
BALEARES 3,08% 34,2% 101 86 154
MADRID 3,28% 48,4% 112 90 114
C Y LEON 2,28% 24,5% 97 111 98
ANDALUCIA 2,33% 24,2% 91 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 2,18% 22,8% 88 106 83
EXTREMADURA 1,94% 19,5% 86 115 79
TOTAL 2,61% 29,7% 100 100 100
Table 14. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Covered population, VAT scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 3,04% 34,1% 110 95 121
GALICIA 2,23% 23,4% 94 111 91
ASTURIAS 2,71% 29,4% 107 104 97
CANTABRIA 2,30% 24,8% 101 115 98
LA RIOJA 2,48% 27,1% 104 110 115
MURCIA 2,38% 24,9% 88 97 85
C.VALENCIANA 2,85% 30,2% 99 91 103
ARAGON 2,71% 30,3% 105 101 111
CANARIAS 2,35% 25,3% 96 107 96
BALEARES 3,00% 34,2% 107 94 154
MADRID 3,29% 48,4% 112 89 114
C Y LEON 2,28% 24,5% 99 114 98
ANDALUCIA 2,33% 24,2% 91 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 2,18% 22,8% 90 108 83
EXTREMADURA 1,94% 19,5% 86 115 79
TOTAL 2,61% 29,7% 100 100 100
Table 15. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Pop. adjusted for need,   VAT scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 3,08% 35,7% 107 91 121
GALICIA 2,22% 22,5% 98 115 91
ASTURIAS 2,68% 28,3% 111 108 97
CANTABRIA 2,31% 25,7% 98 111 98
LA RIOJA 2,48% 26,9% 105 110 115
MURCIA 2,40% 26,0% 85 93 85
C.VALENCIANA 2,86% 30,5% 98 90 103
ARAGON 2,71% 30,2% 105 102 111
CANARIAS 2,36% 25,7% 95 105 96
BALEARES 3,00% 33,9% 108 94 154
MADRID 3,36% 50,8% 108 85 114
C Y LEON 2,27% 23,5% 103 118 98
ANDALUCIA 2,32% 23,5% 93 105 78
C-LA MANCHA 2,18% 22,1% 93 112 83
EXTREMADURA 1,95% 19,0% 88 119 79
TOTAL 2,61% 29,7% 100 100 10017
Table 16. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Real cost, IRPF scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,49% 31,5% 86 97 121
GALICIA 0,65% 14,4% 129 111 91
ASTURIAS 0,67% 21,2% 128 106 97
CANTABRIA 0,59% 17,6% 124 117 98
LA RIOJA 0,46% 20,8% 87 104 115
MURCIA 0,69% 14,4% 117 95 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,73% 20,7% 118 90 103
ARAGON 0,57% 24,1% 108 105 111
CANARIAS 0,61% 16,3% 117 107 96
BALEARES 0,41% 26,2% 63 86 154
MADRID 0,00% 54,9% 0 89 114
C Y LEON 0,55% 16,3% 110 111 98
ANDALUCIA 0,74% 12,7% 135 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,65% 12,2% 123 106 83
EXTREMADURA 0,69% 9,0% 144 116 79
TOTAL 0,56% 23,0% 100 100 100
Table 17. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Covered population, IRPF scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,46% 31,5% 79 95 121
GALICIA 0,64% 14,4% 128 111 91
ASTURIAS 0,63% 21,2% 118 103 97
CANTABRIA 0,57% 17,6% 117 115 98
LA RIOJA 0,55% 20,8% 108 110 115
MURCIA 0,71% 14,4% 124 97 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,74% 20,7% 120 91 103
ARAGON 0,52% 24,1% 95 101 111
CANARIAS 0,62% 16,3% 119 107 96
BALEARES 0,54% 26,2% 91 93 154
MADRID -0,02% 54,9% -3 89 114
C Y LEON 0,59% 16,3% 122 114 98
ANDALUCIA 0,74% 12,7% 135 102 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,68% 12,2% 133 108 83
EXTREMADURA 0,69% 9,0% 144 116 79
TOTAL 0,56% 23,0% 100 100 100
Table 18. Financial effects caused by the integrated scheme 2002-2006 (Pop.adjusted for need, IRPF scenario).
SUFFIC. CO-RESP. PTS pc (integ) PTS pc (no int) P.capita income
CATALUÑA 0,38% 33,1% 63 90 121
GALICIA 0,70% 13,8% 146 116 91
ASTURIAS 0,69% 20,4% 134 108 97
CANTABRIA 0,51% 18,3% 101 111 98
LA RIOJA 0,56% 20,7% 111 110 115
MURCIA 0,65% 15,0% 110 93 85
C.VALENCIANA 0,72% 20,9% 117 90 103
ARAGON 0,52% 24,1% 96 101 111
CANARIAS 0,59% 16,6% 113 105 96
BALEARES 0,56% 26,0% 94 94 154
MADRID -0,12% 57,7% -19 84 114
C Y LEON 0,65% 15,6% 139 118 98
ANDALUCIA 0,78% 12,3% 146 105 78
C-LA MANCHA 0,72% 11,8% 145 112 83
EXTREMADURA 0,73% 8,8% 157 119 79
TOTAL 0,56% 23,0% 100 100 10018
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1 The RAWP formula includes demographic, socioeconomic and health data in the estimation of need. In
addition, it includes some variables that reflect regional inequalities in delivery costs.
2 The percentages of population adjusted for need were calculated in 1996 by Rico & Rubio, who apply the
RAWP formula to the Spanish case.
3 Consequently, we’ll have three different models for each scenario considered, given that we use three
different variables to distribute health care funds among regions: real cost, covered population and population
adjusted for need.
4 We have assumed that the percentage of the personal income tax transferred to the AC’s increases from the
15% to the 16.5% in 1999 and 2000, as a consequence of the latest tax reform.
5 Tables including these results are omitted in the text. Data are available from request.